

CONFIDENTIAL

DCID No. 1/20

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/20

SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION¹

(Effective 6 June 1978)

1. *General*

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12036, and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, minimum security policy applicable to assignment and travel of U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants and employees of government contractors who have, or who have had, access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is hereby established.

2. *Purpose*

This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possible compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation, or entrapment of personnel (stipulated in paragraph 1 above) by hostile nations or groups.

3. *Definitions*

a. *Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)*. The term SCI means all information and material bearing special controls for restricted handling within compartmented foreign intelligence systems. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

b. *Hazardous Activities*. Hazardous activities include assignments or visits to, and travel through, countries listed in the attached Appendix. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place, duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action.

c. *Defensive Security Briefings*. Defensive security briefings are formal advisories which alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, provocation, or entrapment. These briefings are based on actual experience when available, and include information on courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal consequences.

d. *Risk of Capture Briefings*. Risk of capture briefings are formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and of suggested

¹ Existing directives and regulations (including pertinent provisions of the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations) governing hazardous activities as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.

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courses of action they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include instructions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternative explanations of duties and background.

e. *Senior Intelligence Officers.* Within the meaning of this policy directive, Senior Intelligence Officers (SIOs) are those officials representing their individual departments and agencies on the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), including the Military Department Intelligence Chiefs.

4. *Policy*

a. *Unofficial Travel.* Persons granted authorization for access to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources and methods of SCI incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted by their SIO to risks associated with unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in the Appendix hereto. The SIO concerned should advise that unofficial travel in the listed countries without official approval may result in the withdrawal of clearance for continued access to SCI for persons with specific and extensive knowledge of the following categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources and methods:

- Technological structure, function, and techniques of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation systems/methods.
- Designated system targets or sources.
- Method and purpose of target selection.
- Degree of success of collection or exploitation system/method.
- Collection or exploitation system/method capabilities and vulnerabilities.

b. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to or through countries listed in the Appendix hereto must:

- (1) Give advance notice of such planned travel.
- (2) Obtain a defensive security briefing from a specified official before traveling to such countries.
- (3) Contact immediately the nearest U.S. consular, attache, or Embassy official if they are detained or subjected to significant harassment or provocation while traveling.
- (4) Report upon return from travel to their SIO any incidents of potential security concern which befell them.
- (5) Be reminded annually of the foregoing obligations through security education programs.

c. *Official Assignment/Travel.* No person with access to SCI will be assigned to or directed to participate in hazardous activities until he has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk of capture briefing as applicable.²

d. *Individuals with Previous Access.* Persons whose access to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of the risks associated with hazardous activities as defined herein and of their obligation to ensure continued protection of SCI.

² Due consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by U.S. officials having diplomatic status.

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5. *Responsibilities*

a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the SIOs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this policy (Appendix). The Security Committee will coordinate required support including source material concerning these risks.

b. SIOs will issue implementing directives concerning travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such directives will include the overall policy, definitions, and criteria set forth herein and will provide for:

- (1) Preparation and provision of defensive security briefings or risk of capture briefings to personnel of their departments or agencies.
- (2) Institution of positive programs for the collection of information reported under the provisions of paragraph 4.b.(4) above.
- (3) Insuring that new information obtained by their departments or agencies on harassments or provocations, or on risk of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other interested NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes to the Appendix hereto will be made. Recommendations with supporting justification may be made for either addition or deletion of countries.)

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